Three School Shootings in 60 Days: The Warning Signs We Keep Missing (And How to Finally Stop Them)

CrisisWire
Nov 14
24 min read

By Warren Pulley, BTAM Certified | CrisisWire Threat Management Solutions

Between August and October 2025, three school shootings devastated American communities. Minneapolis. Evergreen, Colorado. Rolling Fork, Mississippi. Three different states. Three different school types. Three different circumstances.

One devastating pattern: Every single one was preventable.

On August 27th, a gunman opened fire during morning Mass at a Minneapolis Catholic elementary school, killing two young children and wounding 17 others. Two weeks later on September 10th, a radicalized teenager shot two classmates at Evergreen High School in Colorado before taking his own life. Three weeks after that, another student was shot following a high school football game in Mississippi.

As a BTAM-certified threat assessment expert who has spent 40 years protecting lives—from securing nuclear weapons facilities in the U.S. Air Force, to investigating violent crimes with LAPD, to protecting diplomats in Baghdad's combat zone under daily attack—

I can state unequivocally: These tragedies follow a pattern we know how to interrupt.

The warning signs existed. The behavioral indicators were observable. The intervention opportunities presented themselves. But in each case, critical gaps in prevention systems allowed violence to progress from ideation to action.

This article examines what actually happened in these three incidents, identifies the warning signs that were missed, analyzes what security measures worked (and what didn't), and provides school administrators with a clear roadmap for implementing comprehensive threat assessment programs that prevent violence before the first shot is fired.

Because the next school shooting is preventable. The question is whether your district has the systems in place to prevent it.

Three School Shootings in 60 Days: The Warning Signs We Keep Missing (And How to Finally Stop Them)

What Happened: Three Incidents, Sixty Days

Incident 1: Annunciation Catholic School - Minneapolis, Minnesota (August 27, 2025)

The Deadliest School Shooting of 2025

Morning Mass was just beginning at Annunciation Catholic Church when 23-year-old Robin Westman (born Robert Westman) approached the building carrying three firearms—a rifle, shotgun, and pistol—all legally purchased just weeks earlier after obtaining a permit to purchase firearms.

Students from Annunciation Catholic School's elementary grades filled the pews alongside staff and parishioners for their first-week-of-school Mass, a tradition marking the start of the academic year. At approximately 8:30 AM, Westman began firing dozens of rounds through the church's stained-glass windows.

The attack lasted minutes but left devastation: two children dead (ages 8 and 10), and 17 others wounded, including 14 children. Minneapolis Police Chief Brian O'Hara described the scene as "deeply, deeply traumatizing" and one of the most difficult his officers had encountered.

Westman died at the scene from a self-inflicted gunshot wound at the rear of the church. Investigators later recovered three legally-purchased firearms. On the weapons, Westman had written hateful phrases and the names of several perpetrators of past school shootings—a chilling indication of his fascination with previous attacks.

This attack represents the deadliest school shooting in 2025 and the worst single incident since the Robb Elementary School shooting in Uvalde, Texas in 2022.

Federal authorities, including FBI Director Kash Patel, later described the attack as an act of domestic terrorism and a hate crime against Catholic Christians. Westman's mother had previously worked at the school, though the connection between this fact and his targeting of the location remains under investigation.

The Critical Detail: Westman's firearms bore the names of previous mass shooters—clear evidence he had studied previous attacks and identified with perpetrators. This wasn't impulsive violence. This was planned, researched, and prepared.

Incident 2: Evergreen High School - Evergreen, Colorado (September 10, 2025)

The Radicalized Teenager

Sixteen-year-old Desmond Holly rode the school bus to Evergreen High School on the morning of September 10th, carrying a significant amount of ammunition concealed in his backpack. He appeared to be just another student starting another school day at the 900-student high school nestled in Colorado's foothills.

At approximately 12:24 PM during lunchtime, Holly pulled out a revolver and began firing. Over the next nine minutes, he roamed through hallways and outdoor areas, repeatedly firing and reloading as he searched for victims.

"He would fire and reload, fire and reload, fire and reload," Jefferson County Sheriff's spokesperson Jacki Kelley explained at a press conference the following day. "This went on and on."

Holly shot two students, critically wounding them, before turning the gun on himself. He died later that evening at a hospital from his self-inflicted gunshot wound.

One victim, 18-year-old Matthew Silverstone, remained in critical condition for days following the attack. The second victim, whose identity was not publicly released, was hospitalized in serious condition.

What Prevented More Deaths:

Despite Holly's extended rampage through the school, casualties remained limited because of two critical factors:

Locked classroom doors: As Holly moved through the building searching for additional targets, he encountered locked classroom doors he couldn't breach. Students and staff had secured themselves inside, following lockdown procedures exactly as they had practiced in drills.
Rapid response: Law enforcement arrived within two minutes of the first 911 call and encountered the shooter within five minutes. The first officer to enter, according to Chief Kelley, ran toward the threat "not wearing a helmet, not with any rifle or SWAT gear"—extraordinary courage that undoubtedly saved lives.

The Radicalization That Was Detected—But Not Stopped:

On September 11th, investigators revealed that Holly had been "radicalized by some extremist network." His social media accounts contained references to mass shootings, antisemitic content, and extremist ideology.

More disturbing: The FBI had been investigating Holly's online account since July 2025.

The Anti-Defamation League had flagged Holly's online activity to federal investigators two months before the shooting. According to ADL's senior vice president Oren Segal, Holly "had been sharing symbols and code words that extremists use, referencing past school shooters and even beginning to amass tactical gear."

The FBI opened an assessment of Holly's social media account, but couldn't identify the user's real name or location until the day of the shooting. "During the assessment investigation, the identity of the account user remained unknown, and thus there was no probable cause for arrest or additional law enforcement action at the federal level," the FBI stated.

The devastating reality: While the FBI investigated concerning online behavior, Evergreen High School had no idea one of their students represented an active threat.

Holly's parents cooperated with investigators following the shooting. Search warrants executed at the family home and Holly's school locker revealed evidence of his radicalization and planning, but by then it was too late.

The school had been operating without a full-time School Resource Officer for approximately 10 months while the assigned deputy was on medical leave. Part-time officers rotated coverage, and on the day of the shooting, the assigned deputy had left campus at 10:30 AM to respond to a nearby traffic incident.

Incident 3: South Delta High School - Rolling Fork, Mississippi (October 10, 2025)

After-Hours Violence

The most recent incident in Education Week's school shooting tracker occurred on October 10th when a 17-year-old student was shot and injured following a high school football game at South Delta High School in Rolling Fork, Mississippi.

Details of this incident remain limited, as it occurred after school hours during an extracurricular event. The shooting followed patterns common to many school-related gun violence incidents—escalated disputes during or after sporting events where emotions run high and crowds provide both audience and opportunity.

While this incident resulted in fewer casualties than the Minneapolis and Evergreen attacks, it underscores a critical reality: school-related violence extends beyond classroom hours and beyond the school building itself. Comprehensive school safety programs must address threats that emerge in parking lots, at athletic events, and in school-affiliated activities occurring on and off campus.

The Pattern Everyone Keeps Missing

After every school shooting, the same questions emerge: "Why didn't anyone see this coming? How did we miss the signs? What could we have done differently?"

The devastating answer? In most cases, people did see it coming. There were signs. But no systematic process existed to collect those observations, assess their significance, and intervene appropriately.

The Warning Signs That Were There

Evidence of Planning and Preparation:

Both major 2025 shooters—Minneapolis and Evergreen—exhibited clear warning signs of planning and preparation:

Minneapolis shooter (Robin Westman):

Legally purchased three firearms shortly after obtaining permit
Wrote names of previous mass shooters on his weapons
Acquired significant ammunition
Selected a target with personal connection (mother worked at school)
Chose a day maximizing victim concentration (first-week Mass)

Evergreen shooter (Desmond Holly):

Posted extremist content online for months
Shared references to previous school shooters
Used extremist symbols and code words
Researched and acquired tactical gear
Brought extensive ammunition to school
Planned for extended attack (multiple reload cycles)

The FBI's "Pathway to Violence"—In Real Time:

The FBI's research on targeted violence identifies a consistent "pathway to violence" that perpetrators follow:

Grievance Development - Individual experiences or perceives an injustice
Ideation - Violence considered as potential solution
Research and Planning - Studying previous attacks, acquiring knowledge
Preparation - Obtaining weapons, selecting targets, positioning resources
Breach and Attack - Moving toward target and committing violence

Both the Minneapolis and Evergreen shooters progressed through this entire pathway over weeks or months—plenty of time for intervention if proper threat assessment systems existed.

As I detail extensively in The Prepared Leader: Threat Assessment, Emergency Planning, and Safety, violence that reaches the attack stage is rarely sudden. Most perpetrators exhibit observable behaviors during planning stages. The question is whether organizations have systems to observe, assess, and interrupt the pathway.

The Online Radicalization No One at School Knew About

The Evergreen Case: A Catastrophic Information Gap

The Evergreen High School shooting exposes perhaps the most critical failure in current school safety approaches: complete disconnection between threat intelligence and school awareness.

Here's the timeline:

July 2025: FBI opens assessment on social media account posting extremist content, references to school shooters, and tactical gear acquisition. The user's identity is unknown.

July 2025: Anti-Defamation League flags the same account to FBI, noting concerning patterns suggesting potential violence.

August-September 2025: FBI continues investigating, attempting to identify the anonymous account user. Meanwhile, Desmond Holly attends Evergreen High School daily. No one at the school has any awareness of the investigation.

September 10, 2025: Holly brings gun and ammunition to school and commits attack. Only after the shooting does FBI connect the investigated account to Holly's identity.

The Information Gap That Kills:

Even if FBI had identified Holly before September 10th, would they have notified Evergreen High School? Under what protocol? Who at the school would receive that information? What would the school do with it?

These questions expose a fundamental flaw in American school safety: Law enforcement, intelligence agencies, social media platforms, and schools operate in separate silos with no systematic information sharing.

The result? FBI knows a teenager in Colorado is posting violent content and studying school shooters. Evergreen High School knows it has 900 students but no threat assessment capability. Neither organization connects the dots until bodies fall.

This pattern isn't unique to Evergreen. According to research I've published on school threat assessments and violence prevention, the vast majority of schools lack any formal mechanism to receive, assess, and act on concerning information about students—whether that information comes from teachers, peers, parents, or law enforcement.

Why Traditional School Security Missed These Threats

Most schools have invested heavily in what I call "reactive security":

Cameras that record attacks but don't prevent them
Door locks that slow perpetrators but don't identify them
Security guards who respond to violence but don't predict it
Emergency plans that save lives during attacks but don't stop attacks from being planned

None of these measures address the fundamental question: How do we identify students planning violence before they bring weapons to campus?

Consider what traditional school security couldn't detect:

❌ Robin Westman's legal firearm purchases (no background check flags for someone with no criminal history)

❌ Desmond Holly's online radicalization (schools don't monitor social media and lack access to FBI investigations)

❌ Holly's acquisition of tactical gear (perfectly legal purchases raising no alerts)

❌ Either shooter's fascination with previous attackers (private interests not visible to school staff)

❌ Planning and preparation occurring entirely outside school grounds (homes, online spaces, retail stores)

Traditional security is blind to pre-attack indicators because it focuses on physical access rather than behavioral warning signs.

What Actually Saved Lives (And What Didn't)

Before discussing comprehensive prevention, we must acknowledge what worked at Evergreen High School—because understanding effective response measures is critical even as we emphasize prevention.

The Two Things That Prevented Catastrophe at Evergreen

1. Locked Classroom Doors

As Desmond Holly roamed Evergreen High School firing repeatedly and reloading, he encountered a "roadblock" that investigators credit with saving lives: locked classroom doors.

Students and staff followed lockdown procedures, securing themselves inside classrooms. Holly attempted to access multiple locked classrooms but couldn't breach the doors. Unable to reach additional victims, his casualty count remained limited despite firing dozens of rounds throughout the building.

"Students and staff were amazing. They did their job and they did it well. Lives were saved yesterday because of the actions they took," said spokesperson Jacki Kelley.

The simple reality: Locked doors work. They create barriers between armed attackers and potential victims, buying time for law enforcement response and preventing access to concentrated groups of students.

The importance of this physical security measure cannot be overstated. As I discuss in Locked Down: The Access Control Playbook, access control represents a fundamental layer of security across all environments—from the nuclear weapons facilities I secured in the Air Force to the diplomatic compounds I protected in Baghdad to school buildings across America.

2. Lockdown Training That Actually Worked

Evergreen High School conducted regular lockdown drills. The Annunciation Catholic School handbook notes they conducted three lockdown drills during each school year.

When violence erupted, students and staff didn't freeze. They didn't panic. They executed trained responses:

Immediately secured classroom doors
Moved away from doors and windows
Remained quiet and hidden
Assisted others who needed help
Waited for all-clear from law enforcement

At Annunciation, even young elementary students knew what to do. Police Chief O'Hara noted that children "described getting down, taking cover and helping others take cover, as they had practiced before during training drills."

Training saves lives. Not hypothetical lives in future incidents—actual lives in these specific attacks.

But Physical Security and Training Aren't Prevention

Here's the critical limitation of both measures: They only activate AFTER violence begins.

Locked doors and lockdown training represent essential layers of school safety. Every school needs both. But they address response, not prevention.

Consider the Evergreen timeline:

Months before: Holly exhibits warning signs (online radicalization, extremist content)
Weeks before: Holly acquires tactical gear and plans attack
Morning of attack: Holly brings loaded firearm and ammunition to campus on school bus
12:24 PM: Holly begins shooting
12:24 PM + seconds: Lockdown activated, doors locked, lives saved

Everything that prevented deaths happened in the minutes and seconds after violence began. Nothing prevented Holly from reaching the point where he decided to attack, acquired weapons, brought them to school, and fired the first shot.

True prevention operates in the "months before" and "weeks before" phases—identifying concerning behaviors when intervention can stop violence entirely rather than merely limiting casualties.

This is precisely why my work focuses on comprehensive threat assessment programs rather than solely physical security. Both are necessary. But only behavioral threat assessment prevents attacks from being attempted in the first place.

The Missing Link: Behavioral Threat Assessment

After 40 years protecting lives across every imaginable environment, I can state categorically: The difference between organizations that prevent violence and organizations that respond to violence is systematic behavioral threat assessment capability.

Why Schools Keep Missing Threats: The Three Fatal Gaps

Gap 1: No System to Collect Warning Signs

In nearly every school shooting, post-incident investigations reveal the same devastating pattern: Multiple people observed concerning behaviors, but no systematic process existed to collect and evaluate those observations.

At a typical school, warning signs are scattered across multiple domains:

Teachers notice:

Sudden behavioral changes
Social isolation
Aggressive or hostile communications
Declining academic performance
Concerning content in assignments (violent themes, references to attacks)

Students observe:

Peer posting violent content online
Threats or concerning statements
Research into weapons or previous attacks
Expressions of grievance or revenge fantasies

Parents see:

Personality changes at home
Withdrawal from family
Excessive time online in extremist communities
Acquisition of tactical gear or weapons

School staff observe:

Conflicts with peers or adults
Disciplinary issues escalating
Concerning social media activity

Law enforcement tracks:

Criminal behavior
Online threats
Extremist content (as FBI did with Evergreen shooter)

The Problem: Each observer sees one piece of a puzzle. None sees the complete picture. Without a centralized threat assessment team collecting and analyzing information from all sources, the warning signs remain disconnected data points rather than a recognizable threat pattern.

If Evergreen High School had a behavioral threat assessment team with protocols for law enforcement information sharing, the FBI's July investigation might have triggered school-based assessment and intervention rather than proceeding independently until the September attack.

Gap 2: No Training to Recognize Warning Signs

Most educators receive zero training in behavioral threat assessment. They don't know what warning signs look like. They don't understand the pathway to violence. They can't distinguish concerning behaviors from normal adolescent rebellion or mental health struggles.

Research-Validated Warning Signs Schools Should Monitor:

According to FBI research and the Secret Service's analysis of targeted school violence, concerning indicators include:

Communications of Intent:

Direct or veiled threats
Communications suggesting attack planning
Identification with previous attackers
Statements indicating victim selection

Research and Planning:

Internet searches about previous attacks, weapons, explosives
Detailed questions about security measures
Surveillance of potential targets
Practice or rehearsal activities

Acquisition Behaviors:

Obtaining weapons or components
Acquiring tactical gear, body armor, ammunition
Accumulating materials for explosives or weapons
Stockpiling supplies

Grievance Development:

Expressed or perceived injustices requiring action
Fixation on specific targets
Escalating anger toward individuals or institutions
Communication of revenge or retribution themes

Social and Behavioral Changes:

Sudden isolation combined with hostility
Deteriorating relationships with peers and family
Increased conflict with authority
Evidence of significant loss or crisis
Substance abuse escalation

Identification with Violence:

Fascination with previous school shooters (both 2025 shooters showed this)
Glorification of violence
Dehumanization of potential victims
Desensitization to violence

Holly's behavior checked multiple boxes: online radicalization, references to previous shooters, tactical gear acquisition, extremist content, social patterns suggesting grievance development. Had Evergreen staff been trained in warning sign recognition with clear reporting procedures, students or teachers might have flagged concerning behaviors months before the attack.

As I detail in my Threat Assessment Handbook, effective threat recognition requires both knowledge of warning signs and organizational culture that encourages reporting rather than minimizing concerns.

Gap 3: No Expertise to Assess and Intervene

Even when schools receive concerning reports, most lack trained threat assessment teams capable of systematic evaluation and appropriate intervention.

Principals are educators, not threat assessment experts. School counselors are mental health professionals, not violence prevention specialists. School resource officers are law enforcement, not behavioral analysts.

None of these roles receives comprehensive training in behavioral threat assessment unless specifically provided.

The result? Schools often respond inappropriately to concerning behaviors:

Overreaction: Suspending or expelling students for behaviors that don't represent genuine threats, causing legal liability and missing real threats
Underreaction: Dismissing concerning reports as "kids being kids," missing actual violence in planning stages
Inconsistent response: Handling similar situations differently based on who's involved rather than threat level
No documentation: Failing to maintain records that would reveal escalating patterns

What Schools Actually Need:

Effective threat assessment requires multidisciplinary teams trained in evidence-based assessment methodologies, operating under clear protocols, with defined authority and accountability.

This is precisely what CrisisWire's BTAM (Behavioral Threat Assessment and Management) programs provide to schools nationwide.

The CrisisWire Solution: Prevention Through Systematic Threat Assessment

Having protected lives across nuclear weapons facilities, violent crime investigations with LAPD, diplomatic operations under daily attack in Baghdad, and campus safety operations, I've learned that effective violence prevention requires four integrated pillars working together.

Pillar 1: Establish Trained Behavioral Threat Assessment Teams

The foundation of school violence prevention is a multidisciplinary threat assessment team trained in evidence-based methodologies and operating under clear governance.

Team Composition:

Effective school threat assessment teams include:

School administration (principal or designee) - Decision-making authority
School counselor or psychologist - Mental health expertise
School resource officer - Law enforcement perspective and connections
Student services representative - Knowledge of support resources
Legal counsel (consultative role) - Ensuring legally defensible processes

Some schools add teachers, security staff, or external consultants depending on circumstances.

What CrisisWire Provides:

Rather than recommending schools "form a team," CrisisWire builds threat assessment capability from the ground up:

Comprehensive BTAM Training:

As a BTAM-certified instructor from the University of Hawaii West Oahu, I provide training that goes far beyond generic awareness:

Pathway to violence and warning sign recognition
Structured professional judgment assessment frameworks
Investigation techniques and information gathering
Risk and protective factor evaluation
Intervention planning and case management
Documentation standards for legal defensibility
Integration with existing school systems

Training is customized for educational environments, addressing unique challenges schools face that differ from corporate or government threat assessment.

Policy and Procedure Development:

Teams receive comprehensive operating procedures including:

Governance structure and decision-making authority
Reporting mechanisms and intake procedures
Triage protocols (immediate threats vs. concerning behaviors)
Investigation methodologies
Assessment frameworks (risk matrices, evaluation criteria)
Intervention options and resources
Case management and monitoring protocols
Documentation requirements
Legal and privacy considerations

Ongoing Consultation:

CrisisWire doesn't train teams and disappear. We provide ongoing case consultation, helping teams navigate complex situations, ensuring methodologies remain evidence-based, and supporting continuous improvement.

This is the same systematic approach I used establishing campus threat assessment programs at Chaminade University—building capability rather than providing one-time services.

Pillar 2: Implement Anonymous Reporting Systems

Threat assessment teams are only as effective as the information they receive. Schools need multiple reporting mechanisms encouraging anyone with concerns to report safely.

Why Students Don't Report:

Research shows students often know about threats before adults:

70-80% of school shooters told someone about plans
Students observe online activity adults miss
Peer groups see behavioral changes before staff

Yet students hesitate to report because they fear:

Being wrong and causing trouble for a peer
Retaliation from the student they report
Being labeled a "snitch" by peers
Not being taken seriously by adults

Effective Reporting Mechanisms:

Schools need multiple reporting channels:

Anonymous tip lines (phone, text, web form)
Mobile reporting apps
Direct reports to any trusted adult
Student-to-counselor confidential conversations
Parent reporting procedures

Critical Success Factors:

Absolute protection from retaliation
Timely response to every report (even if investigation determines no threat exists)
Feedback loop (letting reporters know action was taken, without violating privacy)
Clear messaging that reporting protects everyone, including the reported individual

If Evergreen had robust anonymous reporting where students felt safe flagging Holly's online extremist content, social isolation, or concerning statements, assessment might have occurred months before September 10th.

Pillar 3: Train ALL Staff in Warning Sign Recognition and Reporting

Threat assessment teams conduct investigations and assessments. But front-line staff—teachers, counselors, coaches, bus drivers, cafeteria workers—are the eyes and ears observing student behavior daily.

Universal Staff Training:

CrisisWire provides annual training for all school staff covering:

Basic behavioral warning signs
What to report and how to report it
Understanding their role in prevention (observation, not assessment)
Confidentiality and student privacy considerations
Support resources available to students
What happens after they report (process transparency)

Specialized Training:

Certain roles need enhanced training:

Teachers: Recognizing concerning content in assignments, research projects, presentations
Coaches: Warning signs in athletic contexts, team dynamics, conflicts
Counselors: Differentiating mental health struggles from violence risk, appropriate referrals
Administrative staff: Recognizing family crises, parent concerns, community information

Pillar 4: Integrate Physical Security and Emergency Response

While emphasizing behavioral prevention, effective school safety requires layered security combining prevention with physical measures and emergency response capabilities.

Physical Security Essentials:

Based on lessons from Evergreen (where locked doors saved lives), schools need:

Access Control:

Locked classroom doors with interior locking mechanisms
Single point of entry with visitor management
Perimeter security appropriate to threat environment
After-hours access controls

Communication Systems:

PA systems for emergency announcements
Two-way radios for staff coordination
Direct lines to law enforcement
Mass notification systems (text, email, app-based)
Duress alarms in key locations

Surveillance:

Camera coverage of entries, hallways, parking lots, perimeters
Real-time monitoring capability
Appropriate retention periods
Integration with law enforcement

Environmental Design:

Natural surveillance (visibility, lighting, landscaping)
Clear sightlines and minimal blind spots
Secure storage for potential weapons (chemistry labs, maintenance)

Emergency Response Protocols:

Every school needs comprehensive plans for:

Active shooter response (Run-Hide-Fight or similar)
Lockdown procedures (specific, practiced, age-appropriate)
Evacuation procedures and assembly areas
Reunification processes
Medical emergency response
Law enforcement coordination
Crisis communication

Age-Appropriate, Trauma-Informed Training:

Active shooter drills can traumatize students if conducted inappropriately. CrisisWire's approach balances preparedness with psychological safety:

Elementary: Games and activities teaching safety concepts without mentioning shooters

Middle School: Basic concepts appropriate to developmental stage, emphasis on following adult direction

High School: Comprehensive training including decision-making scenarios, realistic but not traumatizing

Staff: Full protocols, scenario training, coordination with law enforcement

We never use simulated gunfire, fake blood, or surprise drills. We always provide advance notice, opt-out options for traumatized individuals, and debriefing after exercises.

The methodologies I detail in my published research on school safety and threat assessment emphasize that effective emergency preparedness builds confidence without creating fear.

How This Would Have Prevented the 2025 Shootings

Let's walk through how comprehensive threat assessment programs would have changed outcomes:

Evergreen High School - Prevention Scenario

July 2025: FBI investigates Desmond Holly's online account for extremist content. Under CrisisWire's school-FBI partnership protocol, federal investigators notify Evergreen's threat assessment team of a student at their school posting concerning content. (This partnership exists because the school has an established, trained team with clear law enforcement liaison).

Early August: Evergreen's BTAM team opens a case file on Holly. Team members:

Interview teachers about Holly's behavior, academic performance, social interactions
Review disciplinary records and attendance patterns
Examine publicly accessible social media (posts about previous shooters, extremist content)
Interview Holly directly in a non-confrontational assessment interview
Contact Holly's parents to gather additional context
Consult with school counselor about any mental health concerns

Mid-August: Team determines Holly represents elevated risk based on:

Online radicalization indicators
Social isolation combined with expressed grievances
References to previous school shooters
Lack of protective factors (supportive relationships, future orientation)
Concerning response in assessment interview

Intervention Implementation:

Mandatory counseling with school psychologist specialized in threat assessment
Parents formally notified and engaged as partners in intervention
Increased informal monitoring by school staff
Connection to positive mentoring and social support
Coordination with law enforcement on firearm access concerns (family weapons secured)
Regular check-ins and case review by threat assessment team

September 10, 2025: Instead of Evergreen High School becoming a national tragedy discussed in news reports, it's a success story no one ever hears about—because the violence was prevented before it occurred.

Holly receives mental health support. His isolation decreases. His grievances are addressed through appropriate channels. His connection to extremist online communities weakens as positive real-world relationships strengthen. He graduates without ever harming anyone.

That's prevention. That's what threat assessment does.

Minneapolis Catholic School - Prevention Scenario

The Minneapolis case presents different challenges because the shooter didn't attend the school and attack planning occurred entirely outside the school's awareness. However, comprehensive community threat assessment programs might still have intercepted this threat.

Weeks Before: Robin Westman legally purchases three firearms after obtaining permit. Minnesota's permit-to-purchase system involves background checks and may include reference checks.

In a community with robust threat assessment infrastructure, references or family members might report concerning behaviors to community threat assessment teams (some jurisdictions are establishing these for adults not affiliated with specific institutions).

Identification of Warning Signs:

Sudden firearm acquisition (three weapons in short period)
Connection to school (mother's employment)
Concerning social media activity (if monitored by concerned family/friends)
Writing on weapons (names of previous shooters)—suggesting preparation visible to anyone with access to his home

Potential Intervention Points:

Family members reporting concerns to police or community services
Gun shop employees noting concerning behaviors (bulk ammunition purchases, concerning questions)
Social media platform algorithms flagging violent content (if such systems exist and have reporting protocols)

The Minneapolis case underscores that school-based threat assessment must connect to broader community violence prevention infrastructure—something many jurisdictions lack entirely.

The Broader Pattern

Both cases illustrate the same fundamental truth: Violence that appears "sudden" typically isn't. Planning and preparation occur over extended periods. Warning signs exist. Intervention opportunities present themselves.

What's missing isn't the ability to prevent violence. What's missing are systematic programs to identify threats during planning stages and intervene before violence occurs.

What Schools Must Do NOW

If you're a school administrator, board member, or safety professional reading this, you have a choice: wait for tragedy to force action, or implement prevention programs before violence strikes your community.

Here are immediate actions your school or district should take:

Immediate (Within 30 Days):

1. Conduct Threat Assessment Capability Audit

Honestly evaluate your current capabilities:

Do you have a trained behavioral threat assessment team?
Are team members BTAM-certified or trained in evidence-based methodologies?
Do clear reporting mechanisms exist for students, staff, parents?
Can your team access information from HR, counseling, law enforcement, IT?
Are assessment protocols documented and consistently applied?
Do intervention resources exist (counseling, law enforcement, family support)?

If you answered "no" to any question, you have gaps requiring immediate attention.

2. Establish Anonymous Reporting System

If you lack anonymous reporting, implement immediately:

Research available platforms (many free or low-cost options exist)
Train staff and students on how to use it
Ensure 24/7 monitoring and rapid response
Publicize widely and repeatedly

3. Partner with Local Law Enforcement

If your school resource officer or local police department isn't integrated into threat assessment, establish formal partnership:

Schedule meeting with chief/sheriff
Discuss information sharing protocols
Clarify roles and responsibilities
Create direct communication channels for threat assessment team

Short-Term (Within 90 Days):

4. Form Multidisciplinary Threat Assessment Team

Identify team members across necessary disciplines:

Formally designate roles and responsibilities
Establish meeting schedule (at least monthly, more if active cases)
Create governance structure and decision-making authority
Develop initial operating procedures (even if basic—refine over time)

5. Implement Universal Staff Training

Provide all staff with basic threat awareness training covering:

Behavioral warning signs
Reporting procedures
School's threat assessment process
Available support resources

This can be accomplished through in-service training days, online modules, or contracted training providers (CrisisWire provides turnkey training programs for districts).

6. Review and Enhance Physical Security

Audit physical security measures:

Can all classroom doors be locked from inside?
Is visitor access controlled at single entry?
Do communication systems work throughout building?
Are emergency procedures current and practiced?

Address deficiencies and budget for improvements.

Medium-Term (Within 180 Days):

7. Obtain Professional BTAM Training

Generic training isn't sufficient. Threat assessment requires specialized expertise:

Send team members to comprehensive BTAM certification programs
Contract with certified trainers for on-site team development
Engage consultants for case-by-case guidance on complex situations

8. Develop Comprehensive Policies and Procedures

Document your threat assessment program thoroughly:

Written policies approved by board
Detailed procedures for each process step
Assessment frameworks and decision criteria
Intervention protocols and resources
Documentation requirements
Legal and privacy protections

9. Establish Community Partnerships

Connect your program to broader resources:

Mental health providers (community counseling, crisis services)
Law enforcement (local, state, federal)
Social services (family support, housing, food security)
Other schools (share information on students transferring, concerning patterns)

Long-Term (Ongoing):

10. Continuous Improvement Culture

Threat assessment isn't "one and done"—it requires ongoing commitment:

Regular program reviews and updates
Annual training refreshers for all staff
Advanced training for team members
Case reviews identifying lessons learned
Adaptation to emerging threats (online radicalization, new attack methods)

11. Data Analysis and Accountability

Track program effectiveness through metrics:

Number of reports received
Types of concerns reported
Assessment outcomes (threat vs. no threat)
Interventions implemented
Success preventing violence
Areas needing improvement

12. Integration with Broader Safety Culture

Embed threat assessment in overall safety approach:

Connection to positive behavioral supports
Integration with mental health services
Alignment with equity and inclusion initiatives
Community engagement and transparency

Getting Professional Support: Why Expertise Matters

Many districts attempt to implement threat assessment programs using only internal resources. While commendable, this approach faces significant challenges:

Challenge 1: Lack of Specialized Training

School staff are experts in education, not threat assessment. Even well-intentioned efforts often miss critical elements because team members don't know what they don't know.

Challenge 2: Time Constraints

Administrators and counselors have full-time jobs already. Adding threat assessment responsibilities without additional resources creates burnout and half-measures.

Challenge 3: Legal and Liability Concerns

Improperly conducted threat assessments create legal liability. Schools need defensible methodologies, appropriate documentation, and legally sound procedures.

Challenge 4: Emotional Burden

Assessing threats to children is emotionally taxing work. Internal team members may struggle with objectivity when assessing students they know personally.

Challenge 5: Limited Perspective

Internal teams can develop blind spots. External experts bring fresh perspectives and experience across many schools and incidents.

Why CrisisWire?

My threat assessment consulting provides schools with comprehensive external expertise combining:

40 Years of Real-World Experience:

U.S. Air Force nuclear weapons security (7 years)
LAPD violent crime investigations (12 years)
U.S. Embassy Baghdad security director (6+ years protecting diplomats under daily threat—zero incidents)
Director of Campus Safety, Chaminade University
Thousands of threat assessments across multiple environments

Professional Certifications:

BTAM Certified (University of Hawaii West Oahu)
20+ FEMA certifications including IS-906 (Workplace Violence), IS-907 (Active Shooter), IS-915 (Insider Threats)
Complete ICS/NIMS training

Published Expertise:

5 books on threat assessment and security
Peer-reviewed academic research
Regular training delivery to schools nationwide

Practical Implementation Support:

CrisisWire doesn't just recommend what schools "should" do—we build comprehensive programs:

✅ Threat Assessment Team Formation & Training - From scratch to fully operational teams

✅ Policy & Procedure Development - Comprehensive, legally defensible operating protocols

✅ Staff Training Programs - Universal awareness training and role-specific advanced training

✅ Physical Security Assessments - Comprehensive audits identifying vulnerabilities

✅ Emergency Operations Planning - Active shooter response, crisis communication, recovery

✅ Ongoing Case Consultation - Expert guidance on complex or high-risk situations

✅ Program Evaluation & Improvement - Annual reviews ensuring continued effectiveness

The Cost of Waiting vs. The Investment in Prevention

School boards often delay violence prevention programs citing budget constraints. Let's examine actual costs:

The Cost of Violence

Direct Costs of School Shootings:

Litigation settlements: $10-50 million (typical range for major incidents)
Criminal and civil legal defense: $1-5 million
Medical expenses for victims: Varies, often millions with long-term care
Facility repairs and security enhancements: $500K-5 million
Crisis counseling and mental health services: $100K-500K annually for years

Indirect Costs:

Enrollment decline (families leaving district)
Property value decreases in surrounding community
Staff turnover and recruitment challenges
Loss of community trust
Decreased academic performance district-wide
Insurance premium increases

Intangible Costs:

Trauma affecting students, staff, families for lifetime
Community reputation damage
Loss of lives that cannot be valued in dollars

Total cost of a single school shooting: $20-100+ million over time, plus incalculable human suffering.

The Investment in Prevention

CrisisWire Comprehensive School Safety Program:

Typical investment for mid-sized school district (5,000-10,000 students, 5-10 schools):

Year 1 Implementation:

Threat assessment team development and training: $25,000-40,000
Universal staff training (all schools): $15,000-25,000
Physical security assessment: $10,000-20,000
Policy and procedure development: $8,000-15,000
Emergency operations planning: $10,000-20,000

Total Year 1: $68,000-120,000

Ongoing Annual Support:

Annual training refreshers: $10,000-15,000
Case consultation and program review: $8,000-12,000
Policy updates and improvements: $3,000-5,000

Total Annual: $21,000-32,000

Return on Investment:

If comprehensive prevention programs prevent even ONE school shooting over a decade (conservative estimate given research showing threat assessment prevents 90%+ of identified threats),

the ROI is:

Investment: $300,000 over 10 yearsCost avoided: $20,000,000 - $100,000,000ROI: 6,500% - 33,000%

Beyond financial ROI, the program protects the priceless: children's lives and futures.

Prevention isn't expensive. Violence is expensive. The question isn't whether you can afford comprehensive threat assessment—it's whether you can afford NOT to implement it.

Conclusion: The Next School Shooting is Preventable

Three school shootings in sixty days killed children and traumatized communities. Three separate incidents with different circumstances, different perpetrators, different locations.

One commonality: Every single one was preventable.

Robin Westman didn't wake up on August 27th and impulsively shoot children at a Catholic school. He planned, prepared, acquired weapons, wrote the names of previous shooters on those weapons, and selected a target with personal meaning.

Desmond Holly didn't suddenly decide on September 10th to attack Evergreen High School. He spent months posting extremist content online, studying previous school shooters, acquiring tactical gear, and developing grievances that radicalized him toward violence.

The FBI investigated his online activity for TWO MONTHS before the attack.

The warning signs existed. The intervention opportunities presented themselves. What didn't exist were systematic programs to identify those warning signs and coordinate appropriate intervention.

After 40 years protecting lives—from nuclear weapons facilities to violent crime investigations to diplomatic operations under daily attack in Baghdad to campus safety programs—

I can state with absolute certainty:

Violence is preventable when organizations have trained threat assessment teams, clear reporting mechanisms, evidence-based assessment methodologies, appropriate intervention resources, and commitment to prevention culture.

The expertise exists. The methodologies are proven. The resources are available. What's required is organizational commitment to prevention rather than accepting violence as inevitable.

Don't Wait for Tragedy: Protect Your Students NOW

Every school administrator reading this faces the same decision: act now to prevent violence, or wait until tragedy forces action—when it's too late for the victims whose lives could have been saved.

Schedule Your Free 30-Minute School Safety Consultation

In this complimentary consultation with a BTAM-certified threat assessment expert, we'll discuss:

✓ Your Current Capabilities - Honest assessment of existing threat assessment systems

✓ Critical Gaps - Vulnerabilities creating preventable risk

✓ Industry-Specific Considerations - K-12 vs. higher education unique challenges

✓ Immediate Action Steps - What you can implement right now, even before comprehensive programs

✓ Implementation Roadmap - Phased approach to building full capability

✓ Investment and ROI - Realistic costs and measurable outcomes

If you have a student of concern RIGHT NOW, we can provide immediate expert guidance on threat assessment and intervention.

📧 Email: crisiswire@proton.me🌐 Schedule Consultation: bit.ly/crisiswire 📞 Emergency Situations: 24/7 threat consultation available

Additional Resources:

Free Training Resources:

Published Research:

Books:

Stay Informed:

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Twitter/X: @CrisisWireSec

About Warren Pulley and CrisisWire Threat Management Solutions

Warren Pulley is founder of CrisisWire Threat Management Solutions and brings 40 years of continuous experience preventing violence across military, law enforcement, diplomatic, and educational environments.

Professional Credentials:

BTAM Certified (University of Hawaii West Oahu)
20+ FEMA Certifications (IS-906, IS-907, IS-915, Complete ICS/NIMS)
Former LAPD Officer (12 years violent crime investigations)
U.S. Embassy Baghdad Security Director (6+ years, zero incidents under daily threat)
Former Director of Campus Safety (Chaminade University)
U.S. Air Force Veteran (7 years nuclear weapons security)

CrisisWire serves schools nationwide with:

Behavioral Threat Assessment Team Development
School Safety Audits and Vulnerability Assessments
Active Shooter Preparedness Training (Age-Appropriate, Trauma-Informed)
Emergency Operations Planning
Staff Training in Warning Sign Recognition
24/7 Emergency Threat Consultation

When violence is preventable, inaction is negligence.

Three schools in sixty days learned this lesson the hard way. Don't let yours be next.

Contact CrisisWire today.

Tags: #SchoolShooting #ThreatAssessment #SchoolSafety #BTAM #ActiveShooter #ViolencePrevention #EvergreenHighSchool #SchoolSecurity #BehavioralThreatAssessment #StudentSafety